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Abstract
Low labor productivity and small scale are key features of agriculture in poor na-
tions. This paper assesses quantitatively the role of self selection and skill investment
of farmers in accounting for these observations. I construct a two-sector overlapping
generation model featuring individual heterogeneity in skill. Individuals self-select into
farmers and workers as in Lucas (1978). As a key ingredient, I allow skill growth in
response to optimal investment. The model is calibrated to reproduce the farm size
distribution and other macroeconomic statistics in the US. Quantitative results show
that low aggregate TFP and suboptimal skill investment are the main drivers of un-
productive, small-scale agriculture in poor countries.
JEL Classification: O11, O13, O41
Keywords: Agricultural productivity, skill investment, farm size distribution, income
differences.
1 Introduction
Two features of agricultural productions in poor nations are striking. The first one is its
stunningly low productivity. Output per worker measured in international dollar is 60 times
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lower in countries from the bottom 5% of the world income distribution, compared to that
in the top 5%. The vast inequality in agricultural productivity across countries is well
documented in Caselli (2005) and Restuccia et al. (2008)1, and has simulated a large body
of research providing feasible explanations. These explanations range from unmeasured home
production as in Gollin et al. (2004), barriers to intermediate inputs as in Restuccia et al.
(2008), low efficiency of workers as in Waugh & Lagakos (2010) and high transportation cost
as in Adamopoulos (2006) and Gollin & Rogerson (2010).
The second, and relatively less well-known, feature is the small scale of production.
I follow a long tradition in the literature and measure scale as the land size of a farm.
International data on the size distribution of farms2 are available from the World Census
of Agriculture (WCA) published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the
United Nations. The data set is an archive of national agriculture censuses from a wide range
of developing and developed countries. FAO processes these national censuses and presents
key summary statistics in a common, internationally comparable format.
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Figure 1: Scale of Production in Agriculture Across Income Levels
To demonstrate the enormous differences in scale of agricultural production across coun-
tries, I present two figures. On the left panel of Figure 1, I plot (log) mean farm size on
the vertical axis, and (log) 1996 real GDP per worker on the horizonal axis. Mean farm size
clearly rises with income per worker - with a correlation of 0.53. An average farm in the
United States, for example, commands 180 hectares of land - 90 times the size of an average
1See also an early discussion in Kuznets (1959)
2The unit of observation in WCA is a holding - defined as “an economic unit of agricultural production
under single management comprising all livestock kept and all land used wholly or partly for agricultural
production purposes, without regard to title, legal form, or size”. Throughout this paper, I view a holding
as identical to a farm.
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farm in Uganda. The inequality in average farm size reflects the differences in the compo-
sition of farms. On the right panel of Figure 1, I plot the (average) farm size distribution
from a group of low income countries, together with that from high income countries3. In
poor nations, 73% of the farms are smaller than 5 hectares. In contrast, 50% of the farms
in rich nations exceed 50 hectares in size. Most of the differences in mean farm size remain
after controlling for country size and types of crops produced.
Farm level data from the US show that larger farms are remarkably more productive.
Using 2007 agriculture census data, I find that farms in the top scale bracket are at least 16
times more productive in terms of sales per worker, and 30 times more productive in terms
of value added per worker, compared to those in the bottom scale bracket4. Productivity
also appears to increase monotonically with scale, as illustrated in Figure 2. Internation-
ally, farm level productivity data as detailed as the ones in the US are not systematically
available, especially for developing countries. In a study of 15 developing countries, Cornia
(1985) found that larger farms have higher value added per worker, but lower value added
per hectare5. With the US farm level productivity data, one can ask how much of the in-
ternational productivity differences are due to differences in the size distribution of farms. I
show that it can be as much as 1/3. Detailed calculations are given in Appendix B.
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Figure 2: Productivity by Size of Farm
3Rich countries: U.S, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland. Poor countries: Uganda, Burkina Faso,
Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
4Substantial differences remain when productivity is measured residually. Computed Solow residual
ranges from 3 to 5 times higher for farms in top scale bracket. The results are also robust when earlier
censuses (92, 97 and 02) are used.
5Similar findings are documented in Fan & Chan-Kang (2005) for a set of asian countries, and in
Byiringiroa & Reardon (1996) for Rwanda. There is a also large literature debating the relation between
farm size and land productivity. See Feder (1985) and reference therein.
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Two questions naturally arise: why farms are predominantly small in poor nations and
how deficiency in scale affects agricultural productivity in these economies. This paper
attributes differences in scale and productivity to differences in unmeasured skill of farmers,
and provides an unified explanation to these two questions.
Differences in efficiency of farmers arise from two distinct margins in the model. The
extensive margin operates through self-selection. As in Lucas (1978), heterogenous indi-
viduals self-select into farmers and workers. The former produces agricultural output with
an individual-specific technology, and the latter supplies labor for a wage. The extend of
self-selection, or specialization as emphasized in Waugh & Lagakos (2010), determines the
equilibrium pool of farmers. The intensive margin operates through on-the-job skill invest-
ment, which is the key ingredient of this paper. Cross-section data reveals on-the-job skill
investment a critical component of farmer’s productivity in the US. Table 4 records the time
allocation between farm work and non-farm work by operators aged 25 and above, whose
primary occupation is farming. Table 5 documents the life-cycle productivity profile of farm
operators. The key observation is that young farmers allocate substantial amount of time to
non-production activities that improve their productivity later on by as much as a factor of
1.5. This paper explores this margin in accounting for international productivity differences
in agriculture.
I calibrate the model to the US. In particular, I ask the model to reproduce the size
distribution of farms and time allocations of farmers. Ding so provides reasonable identifica-
tion of the underlying skill distribution and imposes disciplines on the behavior of on-the-job
skill investment. Given exogenous differences in aggregate efficiency and land endowment,
the model is able to explain most of the differences in agricultural productivity and mean
farm size across countries in the sample. Quite surprisingly, endogenously produced farm
size distributions are remarkably close to the actual ones for a large set of countries, which
I view as support of the mechanism stressed in this paper.
This paper is related to a large literature that studies cross country income differences, eg.,
Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall & Jones (1999). The importance
of dual economy in understanding aggregate income differences has been highlighted in sev-
eral recent papers, e.g., Cordoba & Ripoll (2005), Chanda & Dalgaard (2008) and Vollrath
(2009). In stressing the role of unmeasured skill, this paper is similar to Assuncao & Ghatakb
(2003). However, they mainly focus on the negative correlation between size and land
productivity in an analytical framework. After completing the paper, a recent paper by
Restuccia & Adamopoulos (2009) was brought to my attention. Both papers focus on farm
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size heterogeneity across countries and use a version of Lucas (1978) to endogenously gener-
ate a size distribution. Two key features separate this paper from theirs. Firstly, they do not
consider occupation choice, and instead focus on the uniform time allocation between farm
and non-farm work across heterogenous household members. Gollin (2008) documents stark
differences in the composition of labor force across levels of development. The implications
from this paper is at least qualitatively consistent with his findings to the extent that most of
the labor force in agriculture are own-account farmers. Secondly, this paper stresses the role
of on-the-job skill investment by farmers, which is abstracted from in their study. Hence, I
view this paper as complements to theirs.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the economic
environment and defines a competitive equilibrium. In section 3, I calibrate the model and
present the quantitative results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Each period a continuum of measure one individuals are born, and live for T periods. Indi-
viduals of the same cohort constitute a household, with all decisions made by a hypothetical
household head. When born, individuals within a household draw independently their skill
type, z ∈ ℜ+, from a known, time invariant distribution G(z). The instantaneous utility
function of a household is given by
U(ca, cn) = η · log(ca − a¯) + (1− η) · log(cn)
where (ca, cn) denote, respectively, agricultural consumption and nonagricultural consump-
tion at the household level. η dictates the relative taste towards two consumption goods. a¯ is
typically interpreted as subsistence consumption level. a¯ > 0 implies an income elasticity of
agricultural consumption less than unity, which is a standard feature in models of structure
change.
Each member is endowed with one unit of physical time. Households equally own the
stock of land L¯. There is no population growth or lifetime uncertainty. Total measure of
individuals at any point in time is T.
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2.2 Technology and Household Decision
Everyone works in this economy and faces two occupations: farm manager and worker. All
workers, regardless of skill type, earn the same wage rate. A farm manager combines her
skill (z), labor (ha) and land (ℓ) to produce agricultural output according to
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
hαa · ℓ
1−α
)γ
where A represents the efficiency level. There are competitive rental markets for labor and
land at prices w and q, and output are sold in competitive markets at price p. All prices are
expressed relative to the price of nonagricultural output. A farm manager solves
max
{ha,ℓ}
p · Ya − w · ha − q · ℓ
The residual profit, π(z) is retained by the farm manager. It is straightforward to show
that
π(z) = z · (1− γ) · (p · A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
Although the initial realization is drawn exogenously, skill can subsequently grow through
investment. The law of motion is given by
zt+1 = zt + zt · s
θ
t
where st ∈ [0, 1] is time input. Each period, the household head considers tow alternative
uses of each member’s time: market work or skill investment. If st fraction is allocated to
skill improvement, then (1 − st) is supplied to market work. This skill technology assumes
time as the sole input, and hence abstracts from resources input. This is done for several
reasons. First, it allows for closed-form solutions and clearer expositions. Second, data on
time allocations of farm operators are available to discipline relevant parameters. Lastly,
data on resources investment by farm operators in skill accumulation are limited, if available
at all.
When born, the household head chooses occupation, sequences of skill investment, and
sequence of consumption and saving to maximize discounted household utility. For simplicity,
I assume that occupation can not change over time. This assumption is not restrictive
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because I focus on the steady state in the quantitative analysis. For the same reason, I state
the household maximization problem from an arbitrary cohort as follows
max
{cat,cnt,st}
:
T∑
t=1
βtU(cat, cnt)
s.t :
T∑
t=1
pcat + cnt
R1−t
≤ Y
where R denotes the return on savings, and Y denotes the maximized discounted income
of the household. The following lemmas establish results that characterize the stationary
equilibrium, where all prices are constant.
Lemma 1 Workers don’t invest in skill improvement.
This follows naturally from the assumption that all workers earn the same wage rate w,
regardless of skill type. Thus it is not optimal for a worker to invest in skill accumulation.
Discounted lifetime income of a worker is simply Yw =
∑T
t=1w · R
1−t. In contrast, since
residual profit is strictly increasing in skill input, Inada conditions ensure skill investment
profitable for all farm managers. The following lemma characterizes the optimal investment
profile of farm managers.
Lemma 2 Optimal time investment is independent of initial skill type
The proof is given in Appendix. The lemma implies a common slope of skill profile for all
farm managers, and the level is determined by the initial draw. It is convenient to define
variable xt as follows
xt =

1, t = 1xt−1 · (1 + sθt−1), t = 2, ..., T
{xt}
T
t=1 summarize the level of skill at time t relative to the initial draw. Clearly, {xt} is
independent of skill type. This allows a simple expression of lifetime discounted income of a
type z farm manager
Yf(z) = π(z) ·
T∑
t=1
{xt · (1− st) · R
1−t}
Note that Yf(z) is linear and strictly increasing in skill type z. Recall that discounted lifetime
income of a worker (Yw) is independent of skill type z. This leads to Lemma 3.
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Lemma 3 There exists a cut-off level of skill type, z¯, such that household members with
skill type z < z¯ become workers, and household members with skill type z ≥ z¯ become farm
managers.
The most able members will manage farms and utilize their skills. The less able members
will supply inelastically one unit of labor to the market, and forgo their endowed skills.
The marginal manager, whose skill type is z¯, is indifferent between two occupations. The
maximized discounted income of a household is
Y = G(z¯) · Yw +
∫
z¯
Yf(z)dG(z) + q · L¯/T ·
T∑
t=1
R1−t
2.3 Nonagricultural Firm’s Optimization
There is a representative firm that produces nonagricultural output with a linear technology
Yn = A · Hn. Two remarks are in order. First, efficiency parameter A augments both
agricultural and nonagricultural production, and hence represents economy-wide efficiency.
Second, Hn denotes labor hours and does not embed skills. The representative firm solves
max
{Hn}
A ·Hn − w ·Hn
2.4 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices (w, p, q, R), consumption and in-
vestment (cat, cnt, st)
T
t=1, factor demand ha(z), ℓ(z), Hn such that: (1) given prices, (cat, cnt, st)
T
t=1
solve household income maximization problem; (2) given prices, ha(z), ℓ(z) solve farm man-
ager’s profit maximization, and Hn solve nonagricultural firm’s profit maximization; (3)
prices are competitive; (4) all markets clear.
To solve the model, I begin by solving for prices (p, q). Equation (1) below states the
indifference condition of the marginal manager. Equation (2) below states the land market
clearing condition.
π(z¯) ·
T∑
t=1
{xt · (1− st) ·R
1−t} =
T∑
t=1
{w ·R1−t} (1)
∫
z¯
ℓ(z)dG(z) ·
T∑
t=1
{xt · (1− st)} = L¯ (2)
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Dividing (1) by (2) yields an expression for the rental price of land
q =
[ ∑T
t=1{xt · (1− st)}∑T
t=1{xt · (1− st) · R
1−t}
]
·

γ · (1− α) ·
(∑T
t=1{w · R
1−t}
)
(1− γ) · L¯

 ·
∫
z¯
zdG(z)
z¯
(3)
Substituting (3) into (1) yields the relative price of agricultural good
p =
[ ∑T
t=1{w · R
1−t}
z¯ · (1− γ) ·
∑T
t=1{xt · (1− st) · R
1−t}
]1−γ
·
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α)−γ
·
1
A
(4)
Note the relative price of agricultural good is strictly decreasing in aggregate TFP. To the
extend that poor countries also have lower TFP, this implies higher price of agricultural con-
sumption in low income countries. Solving for optimal consumption bundles and aggregating
over generations yields the aggregate demand of two consumption goods
Ca =
T∑
t=1
cat =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
·
η
p
+ T · a¯ (5)
Cn =
T∑
t=1
cnt =
[
T∑
t=1
(βR)t−1
]
·
[
Y − p · a¯
∑T
t=1R
1−t∑T
t=1 β
t−1
]
· (1− η) (6)
In each household, the measure of workers is G(z¯). Given constant prices, the division of
labor does not change across cohorts. Hence the total measure of worker is simply T ·G(z¯).
The measure of workers demanded in agricultural production is obtained by first integrating
over farm managers within a household, and then summing over generations
Ha =
[
T∑
t=1
xt(1− st)
]
·
∫
z¯
ha(z)dG(z)
Similarly, aggregate agricultural output is given by
Ya =
[
T∑
t=1
xt(1− st)
]
·
∫
z¯
ya(z)dG(z)
Imposing labor market clearing, the measure of workers in the nonagricultural sector is
Hn = T ·G(z¯)−Ha. The output in the nonagricultural sector is Yn = A ·Hn. Good markets
clearing conditions requires Ca = Ya, Cn = Yn. Loan market clears by Walras’ law.
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Lemma 4 Low TFP economy has a lower cut-off skill level, and a higher interest rate.
The proof is given in Appendix B. Low aggregate TFP adversely impacts the quality of
farm managers through both the extensive margin and the intensive margin. On one hand,
low TFP induces a larger pool of farm managers at the cost of lower average efficiency.
The reason is that, with a lower cut-off skill level, the marginal manager is of lower quality.
On the other hand, higher interest rate in low TFP economy also reduces the incentive to
invest in skill improvement because future income gets discounted more. As a result, the
skill profile is less steep. Both margins lead to lower average skill of farm managers, which
translates into low measured labor productivity and small scale.
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Calibration
In this section, I parameterize the model. Model period is 10-years. Individuals are born at
the age of 25 and live for 5 periods. Assuming an annual discount rate of 0.96, I set β = 0.9610.
TFP for the US is normalized to be 1. Parameters of the agricultural production function
are directly inferred from agriculture value added data in the US (see Appendix A). Over
the period 1980-1999, the average share of agricultural output accruing to farm operators is
20%. I thus set γ = 1 − 0.2 = 0.8. This paper is certainly not the first one to estimate the
span-of-control parameter. However, existing works either focus on the aggregate economy as
in Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia & Rogerson (2008) and Gollin (2008) or the manufacturing
sector as in Atkeson & Kehoe (2005). The value of the span-of-control parameters from these
studies range from 0.8 to 0.9. A value of 0.8 for the agricultural sector appears compatible
with these estimates6. Over the same period, return to land and hired labor are almost
identical, which suggests α = 0.5 a consistent value.
I restrict the skill type distribution to be lognormal with mean µ and standard deviation
σ. This leaves 5 parameters (a¯, η, L¯, µ, σ, θ) to be chosen simultaneously to match moments
of the US economy in 1992. From the World Development Indicator, agriculture employs
2% of the labor force. I also target a long run agricultural employment share of 0.5%.
This corresponds to the asymptotic agricultural employment share when the subsistence
consumption share of income is effectively zero. To discipline θ, I turn to data on time
6Restuccia & Adamopoulos (2009) use a smaller value γ = 0.6, but they do not include hired labor in
their production function.
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allocations of farm operators. From 1992 census of agriculture, I extract the number of
days off the farm for operators in 5 different age groups: 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+.
From there I compute the total working days, as well as the fraction supplied by operators
in different age groups. Within the model, this statistic corresponds to 1−si∑T
i=1 1−si
because
operators of generation i spend (1−si) fraction of their time managing a farm. I choose θ to
reproduce the share of operators aged 35-44. However, the implied shares of other operators
are close to data as well7. Finally, I ask the model to reproduce the observed size distribution
of farms in the US. Figure 3 plots the calibrated size distribution against data. In addition,
as depicted in Figure 4, the model also implies a land distribution that fits the data very
well, even though it is not targeted. These figures are presented in Appendix B.
3.2 Quantitative Results
In this section I assess the model’s ability to quantitatively explain cross-country variations
in agricultural productivity and scale of production. Data on sectoral productivity, sectoral
labor shares and land endowment are from Restuccia et al. (2008). The size distributions of
farms are constructed from the World Census of Agriculture (round 1990, 2000) published
by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. These two data sets, however,
are not directly comparable because of time period differences. The data in Restuccia et
al. (2008) pertain to the year 1985. World Census of Agriculture is a collection of national
agriculture censuses administered independently in each member country - possibly in dif-
ferent years (see Table 10 for country specific census years). In principle, this study should
be restricted to countries with their censuses conducted in 1985. As a first pass, however,
I merge these two data sets with two defenses. First, census of agriculture typically takes
place every 5 years in most countries, if at all. It is thus rather costly to obtain completely
synchronized data set as detailed as the present one. Second, even though census year in the
sample ranges from 1980 to 2000. Most of the countries indeed have their censuses conducted
around 1990. It is unlikely that the composition of farms will undergo drastic changes over
a period of five years.
Countries differ in their aggregate efficiency (A) and land endowment (L¯), and are oth-
erwise identical. In particular, they all face the same ex-ante distribution of skill types. I
7See Appendix B for details.
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infer Ai and L¯i of country i as follows
Ai =
ynlni
ynlnus
, L¯i =
LERi
LERus
· L¯us
where ynlni is the nonagricultural GDP per worker of country i, and LERi is the land-
employment ratio of country i. Both are directly available from Restuccia et al. (2008).
To assess the quantitative performance of the model, I focus on the following metrics:
agricultural labor share (La), real agricultural output per worker (ryala), real GDP per
worker (rgdp) and mean farm size (mfs). Note that agricultural employment is the sum of
agricultural workers and farm managers. When computing aggregate output, US price is
used as international price to make results comparable to the data, which is PPP adjusted.
To facilitate comparison between model and data, I divide countries in the sample into
quintile by real GDP per worker in the data. Productivity in the richest quintile (Q.5) is
normalized to be 1. The sample consists of 40 countries with good representation of both
developed and developing nations8. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Quintile rgdp ryala La mfs
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Q.1 0.13 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.66 0.48 7 16
Q.2 0.30 0.35 0.15 0.12 0.34 0.22 56 43
Q.3 0.52 0.59 0.36 0.37 0.18 0.07 83 107
Q.4 0.85 0.87 0.82 0.48 0.08 0.05 68 69
Q.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.05 515 381
Table 1: Model vs Data, by Income Quintile
The model does an excellent job explaining productivity differences. In the sample,
the richest (Q.5) countries are about 8 times more productive overall and 25 times more
productivity in agriculture, relative to the poorest countries (Q.1). The model generates
almost the same magnitude of differences. Note that nonagricultural output per worker
differs by at most a factor of 5 between Q.1 countries and Q.5 countries. Hence exogenous
differences in aggregate efficiency account for about 50% of the differences in agricultural
productivity. The differences in idiosyncratic productivity of farmers explain the remaining
half. These results suggest that the quality of farmers are at least as important as overall
8Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Uganda, Dominica, Pakistan, Ivory Coast, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Tunisia, Switzerland, Portugal, Ecuador, Peru, Netherland, Belgium, Spain, Colombia,
Nicaragua, Ireland, Austria, Germany, France, Denmark, Venezuela, United Kingdom, Finland, Brazil,
Chile, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, United States
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efficiency for understanding productivity differences in agriculture.
Farms in rich nations are much larger compared to those in poor nations in the data, and
so are they in the model. The last two columns of Table 1 records the mean farm size in each
quintile. The model also has rich predictions about the entire farm size distribution across
countries. In Appendix B I plot the endogenously generated farm size distributions along
with their empirical counterparts for all countries in the sample. Even though ex ante all
countries face the same skill-type distribution, the ex post size distribution of farms exhibits
vast variations across levels of income. For a large set of countries the model can reproduce
the actual distributions almost exactly, which I view as a success of the model.
Agriculture, despite its low productivity, absorbs most of the labor force in poor nations.
The model also predicts a much higher agricultural labor share in poor economies. For the
bottom quintile countries, the model predicts a 48% agricultural employment share - about
80% of the actual share. The fact that the model fails to generate a larger agricultural
labor share suggests other forces at work that are not specifically modeled here. Among
other things, barriers to sectoral labor movements are particularly important to the question
posted here. Moreover, such barriers are prevalent in developing nations as evidenced by
substantial disparities in rural-urban earnings. One famous example is the Hukou system
in China that imposes institutional restrictions on immigration from rural villages to urban
cities. Unfortunately, direct measures of barrier to labor movement are not available, making
further quantitative analysis that incorporates these barriers infeasible 9.
Agriculture’s share of total output declines as income rises - a macroeconomic implication
of Engel’s Law. The model predicts agricultural output to be 10% of the aggregate output
in the top quintile countries, and 70% in the bottom quintile countries. In the data, the
value is 3% and 30%, respectively. One possible explanation is that the model over-predicts
the relative price of agricultural output, resulting in a higher agriculture share of GDP
when measured at domestic prices. Using ICP data from the World Bank, I compute the
relative price between “agricultural consumption” and “nonagricultural consumption” for
all available countries10. The relative price in 2005 is around 4 times higher in the 10th
percentile country, compared to the 90th percentile country. In the model, this relative price
9Some measures are constructed indirectly using first order conditions in Restuccia et al. (2008). A
straightforward incorporation of these barriers improves model’s prediction substantially. However, the fact
the farm managers and workers are treated differently in my model complicates the mapping between my
model and the data. As a result, I do not pursue this route.
10“Agricultural consumption” is defined as food, non-alcoholic beverage, alcoholic beverage and tobacco.
“Nonagricultural consumption” is defined as the rest of individual consumptions plus capital consumption.
A similar calculation is done also in Waugh & Lagakos (2010)
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ratio is 2.8, which is roughly in line with the data.
Consensus in the development literature attributes TFP differences as the main source
of income differences. The poorest countries in the sample11 have 4.5 times lower TFP
and 2.1 times lower land endowment, relative to the US. If TFP of these countries is fixed
at the US level, and land endowment at its country-specific value, equilibrium allocations
change minimally. Poor endowment is the least to blame for low agricultural productivity.
In contrast, if TFP is fixed at its country-specific level, and land endowment at the US level,
there is a 22-fold reduction in agricultural productivity. Table 2 summarizes these results.
A reversed calculation implies that improvement in overall efficiency benefits agriculture
disproportionately, i.e., a 4.5-fold improvement in overall efficiency increases agricultural
productivity by a factor of 22. Public policies, albeit agriculture oriented, should aim at
improving overall efficiency through better institutes, better educations and more efficient
markets.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.5% 1/2 117
A only 24% 1/22 47
Both A and L¯ 53% 1/48 13
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 2: TFP versus Endowment
3.3 Discussion
An novel and key feature of the model is to embed skill accumulation in an otherwise standard
Lucas’ span-of-control model. A similar idea was explored in Bhattacharya (2009), who shows
that skill accumulation is critical to quantitatively explain cross-country variation in firm size
distribution and income. While in that paper the main channel of variation is coming from
resources input in skill accumulation, in this model the main mechanism operators through
nonhomothetic preferences. To highlight the quantitative importance of skill accumulation,
I calibrate a version of the model without skill accumulation, and then assess its quantitative
prediction for the representative poor country. The model without skill fails to generate the
observed size distribution of farms in the US. Moreover, given exogenous variables, the model
without skill accumulation in general explains less of the cross-section differences in labor
11These countries are Burkina Faso, Uganda, India, Ivory Coast and Pakistan
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allocation and productivity. Details of calibration and quantitative results are presented in
Appendix B.
As shown in Restuccia et al. (2008), barriers to intermediate inputs have sizeable impact
on labor allocation and agricultural productivity. Here I explore how such barriers affect
agricultural productivity in an environment with idiosyncratic farmers. To do so, I modify
the agricultural production technology to incorporate intermediate input, X .
Ya = A · z
1−γ
(
Xφ · hρ · ℓ1−φ−ρ
)γ
Intermediate good can be converted from nonagricultural output at the rate of π. For
expositional purposes, I suppress skill accumulation. Detailed calibration and results are
given in Appendix B. As expected, the model explains more of the differences in labor
allocation and productivity when distortion in intermediate inputs are included (58% vs.
48% in labor share, 33-fold vs. 28-fold differences in agricultural productivity).
Restuccia et al. (2008) explore the impact of intermediate input on agricultural pro-
ductivity through the intensive margin. However, there are evidences suggesting that the
extensive margin might also be important. Evenson & Gollin (2003) document a substantial
lag in adoption of modern variety in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. There
are two ways skill might affect the use of modern inputs. Through the extensive margin,
low skill might impede the farmer’s learning of the new variety, and delays the decision of
adoption. Through intensive margin, low skill farmers might use modern variety to a less
extent if skill is complementary to modern varieties. Quantitative explorations from these
angles are left for future work.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model that links scale of production and productivity to unmeasured
skills of farmers. In poor countries, subsistence need and low wage rate render farming a
better option for even low skill individuals. On one hand, self-selection results in a larger
pool of farm managers at the cost of lower average efficiency. On the other hand, sub-optimal
investment on the job further depresses skill growth. The calibrated model can explain most
of the differences in agricultural productivity between the 80th percentile country and 20th
percentile country. The results also suggest that quality of farmers is at least as important
as TFP in accounting for cross-country differences in agricultural productivity. Moreover,
the model is able to capture not only the differences in the mean farm size, but also the
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variation in the size distribution across countries.
The agricultural sector characterized in this paper is “poor but efficient”, as articulated
in Schultz (1964). Nonetheless, various distortions geared specifically towards agriculture are
also important. Distortions such as barriers to sectoral labor movements, and implicit gov-
ernment taxation on agriculture as discussed in Krueger et al. (1988) and Anderson (2009),
might be key to understand the coexistence of a large labor force and low productivity in
agriculture in poor nations. While eliminating these distortions is important for development
in agriculture, public policies favoring better institutions, faster technology adoptions and
more efficient markets are of first order importance in improving overall living standards.
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A Data Appendix
• World Census of Agriculture: The data is available through the link
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/world-census-of-agriculture/main-results-by-country/en/
• World Development Indicator: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
• Factor Shares in U.S Farming: Data are from National Agriculture Statistics Ser-
vices administrated by the Department of Agriculture, and can be accessed through
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/FinfidmuXls.htm . In the calculation, government trans-
fers are subtracted from total output and real estate and non real estate interest are
included as capital income.
1985 1980-1990 1990-1999 1980-1999
Intermediate 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.49
Capital 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.20
Labor 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
Land 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Managers 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.20
Table 3: Factor Shares in U.S. Farming
• Working Days by Age of Farm Operator: From 1992 census of agriculture, I
extract the number of days off the farm for farm operators by age (Panel A), assuming
250 working days a year. Midpoint of the interval is used as the interval average.
Panel A
25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total
None 52,938 104,375 110,380 158,629 249,512 675,834
1-99 days 18,015 29,804 25,428 27,061 19,267 119,575
100-199 days 7,872 14,648 14,308 12,423 6,169 55,420
200 days + 10,028 15,565 14,681 11,082 5,087 56,443
Panel B
Work Days (1000s) 17875 33908 34478 46589 66975
% Days 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
Table 4: Days off Farm by Age of Operator
• Scale and Productivity By Age of Farm Operator: The following table is re-
stricted to farm operators whose primary occupation is farming. Mean holding size
is measured by acreage per farm. Productivity is measured by net cash income of
operators.
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Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Mean Holding Size 575 857 909 736 542
Net Cash Income 59,839 90,705 91,501 60,249 32,282
Source: 2007 U.S. Census of Agriculture, Vol 1, Chapter 1: Table 63.
Table 5: Scale and Productivity over Life Cycle of Farm Operators
B Model Appendix
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2:
Profit function is linear in skill, i.e.,
π(z) =π˜ · z
where π˜ = (1− γ) · (P · A)
1
1−γ
(
γ
(α
w
)α(1− α
q
)1−α) γ1−γ
In a stationary equilibrium, the optimal sequence of skill investment is the solution to the
following problem
max
st
:
t=T∑
t=1
R1−tt · zt · (1− st)
s.t : zt+1 = zt(1 + s
θ
t )
Let λt be the Lagrangian multiplier for period t
L =
T∑
t=1
R1−t · zt · (1− st)− λt(zt+1 − zt(1 + s
θ
t ))
F.O.Cs are
R1−t = λtθs
θ−1
t (7)
λt = R
−t(1− st+1) + λt+1(1− δt + s
θ
t ) (8)
From equation(9), if λt+1 is independent of beginning of period skill zt, then (λt) does not
depend on zt. Consequently the equation (8) the optimal time investment st does not depend
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on zt as well. To solve the optimal path, I use backward induction. Clearly, it is optimal to
invest no time in the last period, sT = 0, λT = 0, and hence independent of zT−1. Using the
above argument, λT−1 and sT−1 does not depend on zT−1. Repeating this argument implies
that the entire path of investment is independent of initial skill type.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Consider two economies with Ar = g ·Ap with g > 1, and assume the threshold level of skill
and interest rate are the same. Equation (3) implies qr = g · qp. Given this, equation (4)
implies pr = pp. These two conditions, together with equation (5), further implies Yr = g ·Yp,
i.e., aggregate income is proportional to aggregate TFP. Aggregate production of agricultural
good is also proportional to TFP. However, with nonhomothetic preferences, Equation (5)
suggests that demand of agricultural consumption drops by less than a factor of g. Excess
demand pushes up the price of agricultural consumption, and reduces the threshold level of
skill in low efficiency economy. This implies a higher labor share in agriculture, and a decline
in the supply of nonagricultural good. Interest rate must rise to offset the excess demand.
B.2 Development Accounting Exercise
To simply the calculation, I assume that all farms in size class [sl, sh] have the same size
(sl+ sh)/2. Let si denote the mean farm size, and µi denote the corresponding share in class
i. In addition, let yi and hi denote, respectively, the output and labor. Using U.S. data, I
estimate the following equations
log ((y/h)i) = b1 + b2 · log(si)
log ((hl)i) = c1 + c2 · log(si)
Note that yi is measured by the total market sales of goods net of government payments,
and hi is measured by the sum of farm operators and hired workers. The methodology in
U.S. agriculture census assumes one farm operator per farm. Let ni note the number of
farms report hired labor, and let hli denote the number of hired labor, the total number of
worker in size class i is simply ni + hli. For 2007, the estimated coefficients are (b1, b2)
= (-0.916,0.548) and the R2 is 93% for the first regression. For the second regression, the
estimated coefficients are (c1, c2) = (1.62, 0.058) and the R2 is 72%. Given size distribution
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µi over size class, then aggregate output per worker is computed as
Y =
∑
i
[(b1 + b2 · log(si)) · hi · µi]
hi =
(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi∑
i [(c1 + c2 · log(si)) · µi + µi]
where the second equation gives the distribution of workers over size classes.
To compare against data, I compute the log-variance ratio as var(log(Ymodel))
var(log(Ydata))
. The numer-
ator is the variance of logarithm of agricultural productivity in the model. The denominator
is the variance of logarithm of agricultural productivity in the data. For the current sample,
this ratio is 26.5%.
B.3 Parameter Values
η a¯ θ L¯ µ σ
0.015 0.221 0.3157 0.7842 -3.1236 4.1693
Table 6: Parameter Values
Age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Data 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.34
Model 0.08 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.29
Table 7: Time Share by Age of Operator: Model against Data
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B.4 Model Performances
1. Baseline Model Prediction
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Figure 5: Model Prediction Against Data
2. Model without Skill Accumulation
I calibrate (η, a¯, µ, σ) to match: current agricultural employment (2%), long run agri-
culture employment (0.5%), Mean farm size (178) and coefficient of variation of farm
size distribution (0.5). I ask the model to predict for a representative poor country
with 4.5 times lower TFP and a 2.1 times smaller land endowment.
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Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 3.3% 1/1.6 65
A only 26% 1/16 20
Both A and L¯ 48% 1/28 6
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 8: TFP versus Endowment (No Skill Accumulation)
3. Model with Intermediate Inputs
I set γ = 0.8, φ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.2. For the U.S, π = 1. I choose (η, a¯, µ, σ) to target a
2% current agriculture employment, 0.5% long run agriculture employment, 2% share
of agriculture output of GDP, and the mean farm size. Again I ask the calibrated
model to predict equilibrium allocations for the representative poor country, which has
4.5 times lower TFP, 2.1 times smaller land endowment and 3 times higher relative
price of intermediate inputs.
Exg. variable La ryala mfs
L¯ only 2.4% 1/1.2 88
A only 29% 1/17 18
π only 3.1% 1/1.6 135
A and L¯ 34% 1/20 7
A and π 49% 1/28 12
π and L¯ 3.6% 1/1.9 57
A, π and L¯ 58% 1/33 5
Data 70% 1/51 3
Table 9: TFP versus Endowment (With Intermediate)
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B.5 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution
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B.6 Model Predicted Farm Size Distribution
<10  <50  <100 <500 <1000 <2000 <5000
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Argentina
 
 
Data
Model
<2  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <500
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Greece
 
 
Data
Model
< 5 <10 <20 <50 <100 <500
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Venezula
 
 
Data
Model
<1  <2  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <200 <500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Ireland
 
 
Data
Model
<1  <2  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Italy
 
 
Data
Model
< 2 < 5 <10 <20 <50 <100 <200 <500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
United Kingdom
 
 
Data
Model
<2  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <2  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Finland
 
 
Data
Model
<1   <2   <5   <10  <20  <50  <100 <200 <500 <1000 <2000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Austria
 
 
Data
Model
<10 <20 <50 <100 <200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Denmark
 
 
Data
Model
<5   <10  <20  <40  <60  <80  <100 <200 <400 <600 <800 <1000<2000<4000<5000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
New Zealand
 
 
Data
Model
<2  <5  <10 <20 <30 <50 <100 <200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Sweden
 
 
Data
Model
<1  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <1  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
France
 
 
Data
Model
<1  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Switzerland
 
 
Data
Model
<2  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <200
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Germany
 
 
Data
Model
< 1 < 2 < 5 <10 <50 <100 <200 < 1 
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Belgium
 
 
Data
Model
<1  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Netherland
 
 
Data
Model
<1  <2  <5  <10 <20 <50 <100 <200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Norway
 
 
Data
Model
<5   <10  <20  <50  <100 <200 <500 <1000 <2000 <5000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Australia
 
 
Data
Model
<2   <5   <20  <50  <100 <200 <500 <1000 <2000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Canada
 
 
Data
Model
 < 5  <20  <28  <40  <56  <72  <88  <104  <200  <400  <800 800+ 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Size Class
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
D
en
si
ty
Size Distribution: Model vs Data
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Code rgdpwok MFS (Ha) No. Holding Area (Ha) Census Year
ARG 25715 468.97 378357 177437398 1988
AUS 46436 3,601.68 129540 466561000 1990
AUT 45822 26.42 273210 7217498 1990
BEL 50600 16.06 87180 1400364 1990
BFA 1824 2.79 886638 2472480 1993
BRA 18797 72.76 4859865 353611246 1996
CAN 45304 241.94 280043 67753700 1991
CHE 44152 11.65 108296 1262167 1990
CHL 23244 83.74 316492 26502363 1997
CIV 4966 3.89 1117667 4351663 2001
COL 12178 23.28 1547846 36033713 1988
DEU 42708 32.84 566900 18617900 1990
DNK 45147 34.14 81267 2774127 1989
DOM 12508 2.34 9026 21146 1995
ECU 12664 14.66 842882 12355831 1999
EGY 12670 0.95 3475502 3297281 1990
ESP 39033 18.79 2284944 42939208 1989
FIN 39611 61.88 199385 12338439 1990
FRA 45152 28.42 1006120 28595799 1988
GBR 40620 70.21 244205 17144777 1993
GRC 31329 4.50 802400 3609000 1995
HUN 21554 6.67 966916 6448000 1993
IND 9903 1.69 97155000 164562000 1985
IRL 47977 26.04 170578 4441755 1991
ITA 51060 7.51 3023344 22702356 1990
LKA 7699 0.81 1787370 1449342 2002
MAR 11987 5.84 1496349 8732223 1996
NIC 5697 31.34 199549 6254514 2001
NLD 45940 16.99 127367 2163472 1989
NOR 50275 9.97 99382 991077 1989
NZL 37566 223.43 70000 15640348 2000
PAK 6995 3.80 5071112 19252672 1990
PER 10240 20.15 1756141 35381809 1994
PRT 30086 6.74 594418 4005594 1989
SWE 40125 93.87 81410 7641890 1999
TUN 17753 11.58 471000 5455300 1994
UGA 1763 2.16 1704721 3683288 1991
URY 20772 288.31 54816 15803763 1990
USA 57259 186.95 2087759 390311617 1987
VEN 19905 60.02 500979 30071192 1997
Table 10: Summary Statistics of World Census of Agriculture
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